UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-3-2012

State v. Skunkcap Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
34746

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Skunkcap Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 34746" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4400.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4400

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)

NOS. 34746, 34747 & 38249

)

JAMES LEROY SKUNKCAP,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF

---------------------)
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HONORABLE ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

(208) 334-4534

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7901
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, 10 83703

(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 3
I. The District Court Erred In NO.34746 When It Failed To
Properly Instruct The Jury, In Response To The Jurors'
Question, That The Mens Rea Of Malice For The Crime
Of Malicious Injury To Property Applies To The Act Of
The Destruction Of The Property ............................................................... 3
A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 3
B. The District Court Erred In NO.34746 When It Failed
To Properly Instruct The Jury, In Response To The
Jurors' Question, That The Mens Rea Of Malice
For The Crime Of Malicious Injury To Property
Applies To The Act Of The Destruction Of The
Property ............................................................................................. 3
II. The District Court Erred In NO.34746, Where Its Instructions
On Felony Eluding A Police Officer Created An Unlawful
Presumption In The State's Favor And Relieved The
State Of Its Constitutional Burden Of Proof As To The
Material Elements Of This Offense, And Where The
District Court's Instructions On Simple Assault Relieved
The State Of Its Burden Of Proof As To All Of The
Elements Of The Charged Offense .......................................................... 12
A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 12

B. The District Court's Non-Pattern Elements Instruction
Regarding Felony Eluding A Police Officer Both
Relieved The State Of Its Burden Of Proof As To All
Of The Elements Of This Offense, And Unlawfully
Created An Evidentiary Presumption In The State's
Favor; And This Error Rose To The Level Of A
Fundamental Error .............................................................................. 13
C. The District Court's Non-Pattern Instruction For The
Offense Of Assault In This Case Erroneously Misstated
The Essential Elements Of The Offense Of Assault,
And Thereby Reduced The State's Burden Of Proof
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt As To All Elements
Of The Charged Offense .................................................................... 18
III. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level
Of A Fundamental Error, In NO.34746 When A Police Officer
Provided Irrelevant, Non-Responsive Testimony Designed
To Appeal To The Passions And Prejudice Of The Jury .......................... 21
A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 21
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level
Of A Fundamental Error, In NO.34746 When A Police Officer
Provided Irrelevant, Non-Responsive Testimony Designed
To Appeal To The Passions And Prejudice Of The Jury .................... 22
IV. The Cumulative Errors In NO.34746 Require Reversal Of
Mr. Skunkcap's Convictions In That Case ............................................... 23
V. The District Court Erred In Failing To Conduot A Sufficient
Inquiry Into The Alleged Conflict Of Interest Between
Mr. Skunkcap And His Appointed Attorney In
Nos.34747 And 38249 ............................................................................. 23
A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 23
B. The District Court Erred In Failing To Conduct A Sufficient
Inquiry Into The Alleged Conflict Of Interest Between
Mr. Skunkcap And His Appointed Attorney In
Nos.34747 And 38249 ........................................................................ 24

ii

VI. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Skunkcap's Motion
Alleging An Illegal Sentence In NO.38249 Because
Mr. Skunkcap's Original Sentence For Felony Eluding
A Police Officer, With A Persistent Violator Sentencing
Enhancement, Became Void Upon The District Court
Granting His Motion To Withdraw His Plea To This
Enhancement And The District Court Never
Resentenced Mr. Skunkcap For
The Underlying Offense ........................................................................... 26
A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 26
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Skunkcap's Motion
Alleging An Illegal Sentence In NO.38249 Because
Mr. Skunkcap's Original Sentence For Felony Eluding
A Police Officer, With A Persistent Violator Sentencing
Enhancement, Became Void Upon The District Court
Granting His Motion To Withdraw His Plea To This
Enhancement And The District Court Never
Resentenced Mr. Skunkcap For
The Underlying Offense ...................................................................... 26
VII.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The
Level Of A Fundamental Error, In NO.34747 When
The Prosecutor Intentionally Elicited Testimony From
A Police Officer Regarding Mr. Skunkcap's Exercise
Of His Fifth Amendment Right To Remain Silent.. .............................. 30
A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 30
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The
Level Of A Fundamental Error, In NO.34747 When
The Prosecutor Intentionally Elicited Testimony From
A Police Officer Regarding Mr. Skunkcap's Exercise
Of His Fifth Amendment Right To Remain Silent.. .............................. 30

CONCLUSiON .................................................................................................... 33
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 34

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
In re Speer, 53 Idaho 241 (1933) .......................................................................... 9
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801 (1992) ........................................................... 20
Neder v. US., 527 U.S. 1 (1999) ................................................................. 10, 11
People v. Williams, 99 Cal.Rptr. 103 (Cal.

ct. App.

1971} .................................. 19

Rogers v. Household Life Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 735 (2011) .................................... 9
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743 (2007) ........................................................... 16
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................................ 18
State v. Carper, 116 Idaho 77 (Ct. App. 1989) ................................................... 19
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576 (2011) ............................................. 10,11, 16, 17
State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246 (Ct. App. 2003) ................................................... 27
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) .................................................. 22,23,31
State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327 (2011) ..................................................................... 6
State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54 (Ct. App. 1996) .................................. 12, 17, 18,20
State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613 (Ct. App. 1986) .................................................. 19
State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442 (Ct. App. 2009) ................................................ 17
State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................................................ 11
State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256 (Ct. App. 2003) ................................................... 26
State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903 (Ct. App. 2000) ...................................................... 9
State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667 (Ct. App. 1993) ..................................... 6, 7, 8, 10
State v. Nunes, 131 Idaho 408 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................................ 6, 7, 8
State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 20 n. 3 (1999) ..................................................... 20

iv

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) ............................................................ 22,23
State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152 (Ct. App. 1989) ............................................ 4, 6
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772 (1997) ................................................................ 22
State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................................... 7, 8, 11
State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309 (Ct. App. 2005) .............................................. 22
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2001) .......................................... 9
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267 (2003) .......................................................... 4, 5
US. v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148,1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................. 19
US.

V.

Perez, 116 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1997) ........................................................ 19

Statutes

I. C. § 18-7001 (1) .............................................................................................. 7, 8
I.C. § 18-901 ...................................................................................................... 21
S.L. 1996, ch. 255, §1 ........................................................................................ 15

Additional Authorities
I.C.J.I. 1033 ........................................................................................................ 14

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In this consolidated case, Mr. Skunkcap has raised numerous challenges on
appeal for his convictions.

This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's

responses to these claims.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Skunkcap's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in NO.34746 when it failed to properly instruct the jury, in
response to the jurors' question, that the mens rea of malice for the crime of
malicious injury to property applies to the act of the destruction of the property?

2.

Did the district court err in NO.34746 where its instructions on felony eluding a
police officer constituted a comment on the evidence and relieved the State of its
constitutional burden of proof as to the material elements of this offense, and
where the district court's instructions on simple assault relieved the state of its
burden of proof as to all of the elements of the charged offense?

3.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error,
in NO.34746 when a police officer provided irrelevant, non-responsive testimony
designed to appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury?

4.

Did the district court err in failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the alleged
conflict of interest between Mr. Skunkcap and his appointed attorney in
Nos.34747 and 38249?

5.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Skunkcap's motion alleging an illegal
sentence in NO.38249 because Mr. Skunkcap's original sentence for felony
eluding a police officer, with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement,
became void upon the district court granting his motion to withdraw his plea to
this enhancement and the district court never resentenced Mr. Skunkcap for the
underlying offense?

6.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error,
in NO.34747 when the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony from a police
officer regarding Mr. Skunkcap's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In NO.34746 When It Failed To Properly Instruct The Jury, In
Response To The Jurors' Question, That The Mens Rea Of Malice For The Crime Of
Malicious Injury To Property Applies To The Act Of The Destruction Of The Property

A.

Introduction

In this case, Mr. Skunkcap has challenged as error the district court's failure to
correctly instruct the jury in response to a specific question tendered by the jury to the
court during its deliberations regarding the State's burden of proof. The State on appeal
appears to have misapprehended Mr. Skunkcap's claim, choosing to respond solely to
an issue not presented by Mr. Skunkcap on appeal - i.e. whether the initially presented
jury instructions were accurate.

The question of whether the district court correctly

instructed the jury regarding a question tendered by the jurors during deliberations is a
separate consideration, and one not addressed by the State in this appeal. Under a
review of the case law governing the claim actually made by Mr. Skunkcap, coupled
with pertinent case law regarding the jurors' question in this case, the district court's
response to the jurors' question was reversible error.

B.

The District Court Erred In NO.34746 When It Failed To Properly Instruct The
JUry, In Response To The Jurors' Question, That The Mens Rea Of Malice For
The Crime Of Malicious Injury To Property Applies To The Act Of The
Destruction Of The Property
On appeal, Mr. Skunkcap has challenged the district court's failure to property

instruct the jury as to the requisite mens rea for malicious injury to property specifically
in response to the questions of the jurors regarding this intent. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.26-31.) The sum and substance of the State's response in this appeal to this claim
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of error is limited to an assertion that the court's initial jury instruction as to the elements
of this offense was not challenged on appeal and was a correct instruction of the
elements of malicious injury to property. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-11.) This argument
misinterprets the actual issue on appeal, which centers on the district court's failure to
provide a correct legal instruction in the face of the question by the jurors as to what
mens rea was required to convict Mr. Skunkcap. Under a review of the legal standards
for this claim, there was clear error in the district court's failure to correctly instruct the
jurors as to the State's burden of proof.
As an initial matter, there is a distinction between a claim of error in the pattern
to-conviction instructions provided to the jury by the court and a claim of error in the trial
court's failure to adequately and correctly respond to a question posed by the jurors in
the course of their deliberation. It is the latter, rather than the former, that is at issue in
this appeal. The two claims share the same standard of review by this Court - this
Court reviews de novo whether the trial court's instructions are legally correct.
e.g., State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281-282 (2003).

See,

However, this Court also

applies a distinct mode of analysis to the discrete question of whether the trial court's
response specific to a question posed by the jury during their deliberations was in error.
As a general rule, it is a matter within the trial court's discretion to determine
whether and how to respond to a specific question posed by the jurors during the
course of their deliberations.
(Ct. App. 1989).

See, e.g., State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154

"However, if a jury makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law

pertinent to the case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the instructions,
then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions on the law as
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are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or concern."

Id. (emphasis

added); see also Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 282 (adopting the standards articulated in
Pinkney). Accordingly, the trial court may be under a legal duty to provide additional

instructions to the jury, in addition to the standard jury instructions, where the jurors
submit a question to the district court that reveals a potential defect, gap, or ambiguity in
the initial instructions. Such was the case here with regard to the intent element for
malicious injury to property.
With this distinction in mind, Mr. Skunkcap asserts that the trial court in this case
failed to provide an adequate and legally correct response to the jurors' question
regarding the mens rea for malicious injury to property. The State has claimed in this
appeal that the distinction between mere negligent conduct and the malice actually
required for malicious injury to property is, "an issue not presented in this case."
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) Mr. Skunkcap respectfully disagrees, and asserts that this
issue is central to his claim on appeal given the nature of the jurors' question in this
case.
The jury made explicit its difficulties in understanding a specific point of law with
regard to the charge of malicious injury to property. That is, the jurors were confused as
to whether the State had to prove that Mr. Skunkcap intended to injure the officers'
property or whether "any unintentional damage" could be considered malicious.
(34746 Tr., p.509, Ls.8-10; 34746 R., p.281.)

The case law defining this offense

provides a clear answer. to the ambiguity identified by the jurors regarding the intent
element for malicious injury to property: "[t]he word 'maliciously' is used in the first
clause of [I.C. § 18-7001 (1)] and describes the requisite state of mind with which the
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injury or destruction of the property is carried out." State v. Nunes, 131 Idaho 408,
409-410 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added). Put another way, "I.C. § 18-7001 creates
culpability for malicious injury to property only where the defendant's conduct causing
the injury is accompanied by an intent to injure the property of another." State v.
Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 670 (Ct. App. 1993). Rather than clarify the law for the jurors,

the district court merely informed them that, "[a]s far as the law goes, all I can tell you is
go back and look at the definition of 'malicious' again." (34746 Tr., p.525, L.24 - p.526,
L.1.) This response amounted to a failure to "directly deal with [the jurors'] obvious
confusion," and further permitted the jury, "to speculate on this point of law."

See

Pinkney, 115 Idaho at 1154. Accordingly, this was error. Id.

In addition, the district court's failure to address the jurors' question potentially
permitted the jury to find Mr. Skunkcap guilty of malicious injury to property for conduct
that would not constitute the offense charged.

Idaho Code § 18-7001 (1) does not

permit a conviction for malicious injury to property for any and all action that happens to
result in the injury or destruction of property - only where the action was undertaken
with the concrete aim and intent of such injury. Nunes, 131 Idaho at 409-410; Nastoff,
124 Idaho at 669-670. The jurors' question reflected a basic confusion as to whether
inadvertent damage caused during the commission of any wrongful act constituted the
charged offense.

The law is clear - it does not.

Because the court's response (or,

more accurately, lack of a response) to the jurors' question left the impression that
conduct not within the ambit of I.C. § 18-7001 (1) could be used to sustain a finding of
guilt, this was error. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 341-342 (2011).
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In addition, the State takes issue with Mr. Skunkcap's characterization of the
mens rea element for malicious injury to property as a "specific intent." (Respondent's
Brief, p.10.) Mr. Skunkcap asserts that, under the case law interpreting the pertinent
statute defining this offense - I.C. § 18-7001 - as well as the plain language of the
statute itself, malicious injury to property is a specific intent crime. As a starting point, it
is useful to note what constitutes a specific intent offense. The Idaho Court of Appeals
in State v. Rolon provides a concise analysis on this point:
Negating the specific intent element [of a criminal offense] amounts to
fundamental error. A general intent element is satisfied if it is shown that
the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a specific
intent requirement refers to the state of mind which in part defines
the crime and is an element thereof. In other words, specific intent
requires not only the doing of an act, but the performance of the act
with the intent to cause the proscribed result.
State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 691 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
By statute, the offense of malicious injury to property occurs when an individual,
"maliciously injures or destroys" the real or personal property of another without
permission.

See I.C. § 18-7001 (1).

The destruction or injury of the property is an

element of this offense, and this element is also subsumed within the mens rea element
for this offense.

Nunes, 131 Idaho at 409-410; Nastoff, 124 Idaho at 669-670.

Put

another way, the statute does not criminalize any and all malicious or wrongful action
that happens to result in injury or destruction of property, but only criminalizes the
performance of those acts undertaken with the intent to cause the proscribed result:
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injury or damage to the property of another. Id. This falls squarely within the ambit of a
specific intent crime. 1 See Rolon, 146 Idaho at 691.
Although the State acknowledges that Idaho case law interpreting the statute
defining malicious injury to property has been consistently interpreted to require "an
intent to injure to the property of another," the State thereafter makes the assertion that
the cases so acknowledged, "were merely interpreting I.C. § 18-101 (4)'s language
defining malice,

not re-writing it to require specific intent in lieu of malice."

(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) To the extent that the State is asserting that the cases
do not form part of the law governing this offense, this argument is untenable. First, the
cases cited were actually interpreting the intent required for the specific charge of
malicious injury to property in light of the statutory language in I.C. § 18-7001 (1), and
not merely the statute defining malice generally as contained in I.C. § 18-101 (4).
Nunes, 131 Idaho at 409-410; Nastoff, 124 Idaho at 669-670.; I.C. § 18-7001(1). And,

based upon these decisions, the malice intent required by I.C. § 18-7001 must be
specifically tied to the actual act of destroying or injuring the property at issue.
Second, to the extent that the State may be arguing that the case law interpreting
the offense of malicious injury to property is not authoritative in defining what is required
to prove the offense - and hence the proper law as to which the jury must be instructed
- this argument reflects a basic misapprehension of the role and power of the courts.

However, regardless of the semantic parsing of whether malicious injury to property is
a specific intent or a general intent offense, what is abundantly clear from the law is that
the mens rea element of this offense requires that the malice intent be specific to the
actual injury of property itself. It is not sufficient that the defendant was merely
performing any unlawful act in which an injury may be the inadvertent result.
Accordingly, the State's dispute on this point appears to be one of form, rather than
substance.
1
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The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the resolution of the courts
and is part of this Court's duty in construing statutes so as to determine the law. See,
e.g., State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 519 (Ct. App. 2001); In re Speer, 53 Idaho
293, 241 (1933).

Once the Courts have interpreted a statute, that interpretation is

deemed authoritative and carries with it stare decisis effect.

See, e.g., Rogers v.

Household Life Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 735, 739 (2011). Moreover, where the courts have
interpreted a statute to have a particular meaning, and the legislature makes no effort
over the passage of time to amend the statute, the legislature is presumed to have
adopted this interpretation through acquiescence. See, e.g., Speer, 53 Idaho at 241;
State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 907 (Ct. App. 2000). During the nearly 20 intervening
years since the court in Nastoff interpreted I.C. § 18-7001 to require the specific intent
to injure or destroy the property at issue, the legislature has not amended this statute in
any way, and therefore has presumably acquiesced in the courts' interpretation of this
statute. As such, the decisions interpreting I.C. § 18-7001 (1) as requiring a malicious
intent specifically to injure or destroy property were part and parcel of the legal
standards for this offense, and the jury should have been instructed as to these
standards accordingly.
Finally, this error was not harmless.

The State has asserted on appeal that

"there is no reasonable view of the evidence that Skunkcap did not act intentionally
when he rammed two stopped police cars."

(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.)

The

State's assertion is unavailing because it misapprehends the State's evidentiary burden
at issue for the intent element of malicious injury to property, and misstates the correct
standard of this Court's review and the nature of the evidence at trial.
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The question for the jury as to the charge of malicious injury to property was not
whether Mr. Skunkcap intentionally or maliciously collided with the officers while trying
to avoid their vehicles, but whether he intended specifically to damage these vehicles.
"The words of the statute do not imply a legislative intent to create criminal liability under
this section where the injury to property was an unintended consequence of conduct
that may have violated another statute." Nastoff, 124 Idaho at 669-670. Accordingly,
the question for this Court is not whether there is overwhelming and uncontroverted
evidence that Mr. Skunkcap intentionally or maliciously collided with Detective Collins'
unmarked truck (which is the only potential basis of criminal liability found by the jury for
this charge), but whether there is overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that
Mr. Skunkcap had the intent specifically to damage this truck.
Second, because the district court's failure to correct the jurors' confusion as to
the mens rea element in this case potentially permitted the jurors to find Mr. Skunkcap
guilty of malicious injury to property for conduct not criminal under the statute, and
relieved the State of its burden of proof as to the intent to injure or destroy property, this
Court applies the standard of harmless error articulated in Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1,
15-20 (1999). See also State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 591-592 (2011) (applying the
Neder harmless error test to claim of fundamental error in jury instruction that relieved
the State of its burden of proof as to the elements of the charged offense).
The test for harmlessness under Neder is whether it appears, "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 14 (1967)). Under
this test, the proper inquiry for this Court is whether, "the record contains evidence that
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could rationally lead to a finding for the defendant with respect to the omitted element."
Rolon, 146 Idaho at 689.

In addition, the element at issue must be uncontested and

supported by overwhelming evidence. Neder, 527 U.S. at 17. If the defendant contests
the omitted element, the requirement pronounced in Neder that the "omitted element
was uncontested," is not met and the error cannot be said to be harmless. Draper, 151
Idaho at 592.
The record reflects that Mr. Skunkcap vigorously contested the issue of whether
he intended to damage the vehicles that he collided with through his own testimony at
trial. Mr. Skunkcap testified that, prior to the collision, he did not see any approaching
vehicles. (34746 Tr., p.425, Ls.18-22.) He further testified that he did not back into the
second officer's vehicle that was coming at him from behind, but that this officer was the
one who collided into Mr. Skunkcap's car. (34746 Tr., p.435, Ls.10-24.) Most notably,
when asked directly if he intended to injure or harm either of the two vehicles involved in
the collisions, Mr. Skunkcap denied having this intent. (34746 Tr., p.435, L.25 - p.436,
L.4.)

Accordingly, the intent element for malicious injury to property was entirely

controverted at trial.
Moreover, the jury's verdict in this case reflects that they did not fully accept the
State's version of the evidence with regard to Mr. Skunkcap's alleged conduct.

The

jurors in this case entered a hand-written finding that they were limiting their finding as
to guilt for malicious injury to property to solely the "second collision to 2003 red Ford
Escape." (R., p.226.) Where the jury enters such an acquittal, it is important evidence
that the jury did not entirely accept the State's version of the facts for purposes of
harmless error review. See, e.g., State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70,74 (Ct. App. 2005).
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Finally, the nature of the jurors' question, in and of itself, constitutes a measure of

prima facie proof that there was not overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that
Mr. Skunkcap intended to injure Detective Collins' truck.

The jury was clearly

concerned as to whether there was proof of the intent to cause injury, as their query
focused on whether such a finding was required or whether, when committing a
wrongful act, "any unintentional damage" could be considered malicious.

(34746

Tr., p.509, Ls.8-10; 34746 R., p.281.) Clearly the jury considered the issue of whether
the damage was intended by Mr. Skunkcap to be in dispute, given the nature of their
question to the trial court. See Gittins, 129 Idaho at 57 (holding that "It is obvious that
the jury considered the element of penetration to be in dispute as illustrated by the
request for further clarification.").
Accordingly, the district court's error in failing to correctly instruct the jury in
response to their question as to the mens rea element for malicious injury to property
was not harmless.

II.
The District Court Erred In No.34746, Where Its Instructions On Felony Eluding A Police
Officer Created An Unlawful Presumption In The State's Favor And Relieved The State
Of Its Constitutional Burden Of Proof As To The Material Elements Of This Offense,
And Where The District Court's Instructions On Simple Assault Relieved The State Of
Its Burden Of Proof As To All Of The Elements Of The Charged Offense
A.

Introduction
The district court provided the jury with non-pattern elements instructions in this

case with regard to both the offense of felony eluding a police officer and assault. In
both cases, the non-pattern instructions relieved the State of its burden of proof as to
both offenses. Contrary to the State's assertion with regard to the instructions for felony
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eluding a police officer, an instruction can have the effect of relieving the State of its
burden of proof as to the charged offense even if the instruction parrots the language
contained in the relevant statute if the manner in which the court presents the elements
does not reflect the proper burden of proof for the offense. The court's instruction on
felony eluding a police officer did so in this case.

In addition, this Reply Brief is

necessary to clarify that the doctrine of invited error is not properly applicable with
regard to Mr. Skunkcap's claim of error regarding the jury instruction purporting to
define the elements of assault in this case.

B.

The District Court's Non-Pattern Elements Instruction Regarding Felony Eluding
A Police Officer Both Relieved The State Of Its Burden Of Proof As To All Of The
Elements Of This Offense, And Unlawfully Created An Evidentiary Presumption
In The State's Favor; And This Error Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error
There are three primary arguments that the State raises in response to

Mr. Skunkcap's allegation of error in the non-pattern elements instruction that the district
court provided to the jury for the offense of felony eluding an officer. First, the State
asserts that this instruction is "similar to the language used in the model instructions,"
and uses the language incorporated into the statute defining this offense, and therefore
by the State's reasoning could not be erroneous. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Second,
the State claims that Mr. Skunkcap, "has failed to cite any case in which an instruction
using the statutory language applicable to a crime has risen to a violation of due
process." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Third, the State posits that any error is harmless
given a potentially conflicting portion of the same instruction. Mr. Skunkcap will address
each of these claims in turn.
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As to the State's initial claim, Mr. Skunkcap disputes that the instruction provided
by the district court is similar to the model pattern instructions. In fact, the two differ in
one critical and material respect.

The model pattern instructions make clear that, as

part of the State's burden of proof at trial, the State must establish that the, "signal to
stop must be given by emergency lights or siren which a reasonable person knew or
should have known was intended to bring the pursued vehicle to a stop." See I.C.J.1.
1033 (emphasis added).

Through setting out that the signal to stop "must be" of a

particular nature - i.e. such that a reasonable person would have known that he or she
was being signaled to stop - this instruction makes it clear to the jury that this finding is
required along with all of the other remaining elements in order to find the defendant
guilty.
In contrast, after setting out the statutory elements for this offense, the district
court departed from the approved-of language and informed the jury in an entirely
separate provision that, "** It is sufficient proof that a reasonable person who knew or

should have known that the visual or audible signal given by a peace officer was
intended to bring pursued vehicle to a stop." (R., p.245) (emphasis in the original). By
setting this provision apart from the elements instruction physically, and further
separating out this provision by marking it with two asterisks and italicized font, the
court's language carries with it the clear import that, in order to convict the defendant "it
is sufficient proof" for the offense if the jury were merely to find that a reasonable person
knew or should have known that he or she was being signaled to stop. The difference
in language between the model pattern instructions and that provided by the Court is
that the pattern instructions make clear that the nature of the signal is part of the State's
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burden of proof at trial - i.e. the signal must be such that a reasonable person would
have known that he or she was being signaled to stop - whereas the court's instructions
implied that it was sufficient proof for the offense standing alone that a reasonable
person would have known that he or she was being signaled to stop.
The State is also incorrect when it asserts that the language used is an accurate
reflection of the statute in light of the legislative history for this provision of the statute.
Mr. Skunkcap discussed this history at length in his Appellant's Brief (see Appellant's
Brief, pp.35-37), but the clearest evidence that the court's instruction in this case did not
accurately reflect the substance of the statute can be found in the legislative history of
the provision at issue. The disputed language was added to I.C. § 49-1404 in 1996.
See S.L. 1996, ch. 255, § 1. In clarifying the meaning and import of this language, the

legislature made clear that the disputed language contained in this statute, "would
require the prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person knew or
should have known that he or she was required to pull over and stop." S.L. 1996, ch.
255, §1. Therefore, although the language provided by the district court is similar to that
employed within the statute defining felony eluding an officer, the manner in which this
language was presented to the jury had the effect of diminishing the State's burden of
proof at trial.
Which leads to the State's second contention: that Mr. Skunkcap, "has failed to
cite any case in which an instruction using the statutory language applicable to a crime
has risen to a violation of due process."

(Respondent's Brief, p.14.)

This is not a

correct assertion. Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court in Draper held precisely that: the
elements instruction provided to the jury for conspiracy in Draper did contain all of the

15

elements for the charged offense; and Mr. Skunkcap has cited to this case on appeal.
See Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-592. (See also Appellant's Brief, pp.31-41.) In Draper, it
was the manner in which the court presented the statutory elements of the offense that
resulted in a jury instruction that relieved the State of its burden of proof at trial.
In Draper, the district court presented the jury with an elements instruction that
contained all of the elements of the charged offense, and therefore parroted the
language of the relevant statute, but the court erroneously listed one of the essential
elements as an alternate theory of demonstrating an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, rather than a free-standing element in its own right.

Id. at 589-590.

Because the trial court presented the separate element, that the action be undertaken in
furtherance of the conspiracy, as being one of several alternative overt acts, rather than
an element required in addition to the finding of an overt act, the Draper Court held
that this instruction relieved the State of its burden of proof and violated due process.
Id. at 590-592.

This finding was predicated on the manner in which the statutory

elements were presented to the jury, despite the fact that the statutory elements were
technically present within the instruction.
Additionally, to the extent that the State implies that the test for whether due
process has been violated is whether an elements instruction merely contains the
language within the statute, this misstates the standard. "The United States Supreme
Court has held that in criminal trials 'the State must prove every element of the offense,
and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to this requirement."
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007) (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S.
433, 437 (2004)).

Accordingly, whether a jury instruction violates due process by
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reducing the State's burden of proof of the elements of an offense is measured by the
effect of the language used, not whether the instruction merely contains the language
of the statute. As has been noted, if a jury instruction contains the language of the
statute defining the offense, but presents this language in a manner that fails to clearly
require the jury to find all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, this
violates a defendant's right to due process. Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-592.
Moreover, to the extent that there existed another statement within this
instruction that provided that the jury must find Mr. Skunkcap guilty "if each of the above
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt," this did not cure the error. This language
followed both the list of the elements for eluding a police officer and the language that
was separated out and improperly created an evidentiary presumption in the State's
favor. (34746 R., p.245.) Because the language at issue, and the presumption in the
State's favor that this language would appear to create, is likewise "above" the language
relied upon by the State within the instruction, the same problem persists.
At best, the passage relied upon by the State merely resulted in a conflict within
the jury instructions as to what proof was sufficient in order to establish the offense of
felony eluding an officer.

And it is likewise error to provide the jury with conflicting

instructions as to the required burden of proof and elements of the offense in a criminal
case. See State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 445 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Gittins, 129
Idaho 54, 57-58 (Ct. App. 1996). In particular, the Gittins Court noted that where one
portion of the jury instructions relieved the State of its burden of proof as to the charged
offense and created an evidentiary presumption in the State's favor, "[t]he instructions
as a whole became inherently contradictory and failed to accurately reflect the law."
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Gittins, 129 Idaho at 57-58.

Accordingly, the State's argument to the contrary is

misplaced.

C.

The District Court's Non-Pattern Instruction For The Offense Of Assault In This
Case Erroneously Misstated The Essential Elements Of The Offense Of Assault,
And Thereby Reduced The State's Burden Of Proof Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt As To All Elements Of The Charged Offense
The State's sole contention on appeal with regard to the erroneous elements

instruction provided to the jury for the charge of assault is a claim that the invited error
doctrine precludes this Court's review of this issue. Mr. Skunkcap asserts that, given
the limitations placed on the doctrine of invited error by Idaho courts, and in light of
persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions with similar limitations, the invited error
doctrine is inapplicable in this case.
The State correctly notes that the elements instruction provided by the district
court for assault is substantially the same as that tendered by defense counsel at trial.
(34746 R., pp.210, 262; see also Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) In addition, appellate
courts have applied the doctrine of invited error to allegations of instructional error under
certain circumstances, such as the failure of a trial court to tender a lesser included
offense instruction where defense counsel has objected to the court doing so.

See,

e.g., State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402 (Ct. App. 2000).
However, there are limits to the applications of the invited error doctrine. The
outer boundaries of the invited error doctrine have been set forth by the Idaho Court of
Appeals in State v. Griffith:
There are, of course, limits to this doctrine. It would not apply to a
requested sentence that violates the court's statutory authority. Neither
would it apply to a request made without an apparent tactical purpose.
Moreover, relief might be appropriate if defense counsel heedlessly
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disregarded his client's legitimate interests, or otherwise provided
ineffective assistance, in a sentencing proceeding.
State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal citations omitted); see also
State v. Carper, 116 Idaho 77, 79-80 (Ct. App. 1989) (reiterating the above-quoted

standard from Griffith).
Other courts applying similar limitations to the application of the invited error
doctrine have held, in the context of a flawed jury instruction that omits an element of
the charged offense, that the invited error doctrine does not apply even if defense
counsel requested the instruction. See U.S. v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 843-846 (9th Cir. 1997); People

V.

Williams, 99

Cal.Rptr. 103, 121-122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). In those cases where the record does not
reflect a conscious choice by counsel to forego a jury finding as to an essential element
of a charged offense, but rather reflects inadvertence or mistake on the part of trial
counsel, these courts have held that the purposes behind the invited error doctrine are
not served and therefore declined to apply this doctrine. Id.
The instructional error in this case falls outside of the boundaries established by
Idaho case law for the application of the invited error doctrine. There is nothing in the
record that shows, or could sustain a finding, of any strategic or tactical purpose in
defense counsel submitting an instruction that substantially reduced the State's burden
of proof at trial.

In absence of such evidence, the instructional error in this case

appears to fall within the exception carved out by the courts in Griffith and Carper for a
"request made without an apparent tactical purpose."

Carper, 116 Idaho at 79-80;

Griffith, 110 Idaho at 614. Additionally, the erroneous instruction is affirmatively shown

not to be part of a tactical strategy on the part of trial counsel, as Mr. Skunkcap
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vigorously disputed that he ever harbored any intention to strike or harm the officers or
their vehicles with his car at trial. (34647 Tr., p.446, L.10 - p.449, L.20.)
Moreover, there appears to be at least one case in Idaho wherein the Idaho
Supreme Court has declined to apply the doctrine of invited error to an erroneous jury
instruction that relieved the State of its burden of proof of the elements of an offense.

See State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 20 n. 3 (1999).

In Nunez, the defendant was

convicted of felony tax violations. Id. at 16. On appeal, he challenged his conviction for
felony tax evasion because the jury instructions omitted the element that the defendant
must intentionally seek to evade, defeat or avoid paying a sales tax - and it was this
element that elevated the defendant's charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. Id. at
19-20. Although the State attempted to invoke invited error to bar judicial review of this
alleged error, the Nunez Court declined to apply this doctrine, and instead held that,
"There is no invited error, as the State asserts, when defense counsel submitted
improper instructions that were ultimately given." Id. at 20 n.3.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals in Gittins likewise declined to apply the
doctrine of invited error to a jury instruction that relieved the State of its burden of proof.

Gittins, 129 Idaho at 58. Although the Gittins Court did so on the basis of a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel in trial counsel's consent to the erroneous instruction,
Mr. Skunkcap asserts that a different, but related, rationale should be applied by this
Court against the State's request on appeal to apply the invited error doctrine. 2

Mr. Skunkcap does not assert any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel herein,
but chooses to reserve any such claim for any future petition for post-conviction relief,
should one be forthcoming. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992)
(defendant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel either on direct appeal
or through a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both).
2
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The Griffith and Carper Courts recognized that, in addition to ineffective
assistance of counsel, a "a request made without an apparent tactical purpose" can also
stand as an independent exception to the application of the invited error doctrine. Here,
there was no apparent tactical purpose to the request for an elements instruction for
assault that essentially permitted a finding of guilt on a strict liability basis. Based upon
the erroneous instruction, the jury could find Mr. Skunkcap guilty of this offense if he did
any act, so long as it resulted in some well-founded fear of harm in another, rather than
what is required by statute: that Mr. Skunkcap intentionally and unlawfully threaten the
officer in addition to the officer experiencing a well-founded fear of harm.

See

I.C. § 18-901. There is no conceivable tactical purpose for defense counsel to reduce
the State's burden of proof at trial in this regard. Rather, this request appears to reflect
a mistaken understanding on the part of trial counsel as to the elements of assault.
Accordingly, Mr. Skunkcap respectfully submits that this Court should decline the
State's request to apply the doctrine of invited error in this case.

III.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error,
In NO.34746 When A Police Officer Provided Irrelevant, Non-Responsive Testimony
Designed To Appeal To The Passions And Prejudice Of The Jury

A.

Introduction
Appeals to the passions and prejudices of the jury, or attempts on the part of the

prosecution to secure a conviction on any factor other than the law and the evidence,
impact upon a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.

Such a

constitutionally improper appeal took place in this case with regard to Officer Dahlquist's
irrelevant and non-responsive testimony that Mr. Skunkcap did not have regard for the
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safety of anyone on the street on the day in question. The record in this case is clear
that this due process violation occurred and that it was not harmless.

B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental
Error, In NO.34746 When A Police Officer Provided Irrelevant, Non-Responsive
Testimony Designed To Appeal To The Passions And Prejudice Of The Jury
In response to Mr. Skunkcap's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, rising to the

level of a fundamental error, in Officer's Dahlquist's improper testimony, the State first
asserts that this testimony falls within the category of evidentiary error as opposed to
constitutional error.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.17 -18.) While the challenged testimony

provided at trial was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the State's argument
overlooks the core issue as to why this evidence was unduly prejudicial: because
Officer's Dahlquist's unsolicited statements were an appeal to the passions and
prejudice of the jurors which constitutes a violation of Mr. Skunkcap's due process right
to fairness at trial. See, e.g., State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62 (2011); State v. Porter,
130 Idaho 772, 730 (1997); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005).
Such testimony can rise to the level of a due process violation because an appeal to the
jurors' emotions is an improper attempt to induce the jury to convict the defendant
based upon factors aside from the law or the evidence at trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 227 (2010). Because the challenged testimony was an appeal to the passions and
prejudice of the jury, this impacted Mr. Skunkcap's due process right to fairness in his
trial proceedings and was therefore of a constitutional magnitude.
Regarding whether the error was plain on the record, the State appears to
conflate the question of whether the error was harmless with the question of whether
the error was plain.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19.)
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The salient question from this

Court is whether, on the face of the record, the error plainly exists; and this error is plain
on the face of the record in this case. The officer's response was irrelevant, uncalled
for, and plainly sought to invoke both the jurors' fear and their personal rebuke of
Mr. Skunkcap based upon the officer's derogatory remarks. Such testimony on the part
of a police officer is misconduct under clear legal standards. See Ellington, 151 Idaho
at 60-61.
Finally, Mr. Skunkcap submits that this error was not harmless for the reasons
articulated within his Appellant's Brief. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.47-48.)

IV.
The Cumulative Errors In NO.34746 Require Reversal Of Mr. Skunkcap's Convictions In
That Case
The State correctly notes in its Respondent's Brief that this Court does not
aggregate the prejudice for un-objected to errors; and that all but one of Mr. Skunkcap's
claims of error with regard to his trial in 34746 were allegations of fundamental error.

See Perry, 150 Idaho at 230. (See also Respondent's Brief, at 20.)

Accordingly,

Mr. Skunkcap withdraws his claim of cumulative error with regard to the errors alleged
in 34746.

V.
The District Court Erred In Failing To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Into The Alleged
Conflict Of Interest Between Mr. Skunkcap And His Appointed Attorney In Nos.34747
And 38249

A.

Introduction
In both 34747 and 38249, Mr. Skunkcap conveyed to the district court that there

existed a potential conflict of interest between himself and his counsel, but the district
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court failed to make an adequate inquiry into this conflict. The State's sole response on
appeal is to deny that Mr. Skunkcap ever conveyed to the district court that a particular
conflict may have existed. Because this assertion is belied by the record, Mr. Skunkcap
asserts that the State's claim is without merit.

B.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Into The
Alleged Conflict Of Interest Between Mr. Skunkcap And His Appointed Attorney
In Nos.34747 And 38249
As a preliminary point of clarification, the State in its Respondent's Brief appears

to partially misapprehend Mr. Skunkcap's allegation of error with regard to the failure to
conduct a sufficient inquiry into his assertion of a conflict with his counsel in 34747 and
38249. The State appears to reference a prior hearing involving predecessor counsel,
Randall Schulthies, and Mr. Skunkcap that occurred in 34747, and that involved a
different potential conflict than that at issue in this appeal, in claiming that Mr. Skunkcap
actually opposed a motion for substitute counsel. (See 34747 R., pp.184-185; 34747
Tr., p.204, L.5 - p.212, L.16; Respondent's Brief, p.25.)

The allegations of error in

within this appeal do not deal with this aspect of Mr. Skunkcap's trial - his claims are
instead rooted in a subsequent conflict that Mr. Skunkcap alleged toward the attorneys
appointed in Mr. Schulthies' stead, subsequent to Mr. Schulthies' withdrawal.

(See

Appellant's Brief, pp.49-55.)
The State's remaining argument that Mr. Skunkcap did not convey to the district
court that there existed a potential conflict between himself and the counsel he was
appointed after Mr. Schulthies withdrew is not borne out by the record in this case.
Regarding the alleged conflict in 34747, Mr. Skunkcap initially informed the district court
that he had been having difficulties with his counsel. (34747 Tr., p.471 , L.14 - p.472,
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L.9.)

Although the district court did not ask for elaboration on his complaints,

Mr. Skunkcap attempted to renew his objection to his appointed counsel at a
subsequent point in the proceedings.

When later asked if he had questions or

comments for the court, Mr. Skunkcap asserted that he felt like his rights were being
violated and that his trial counsel was unwilling to pursue these issues because they
involved issues with former counsel, Mr. Schulthies, who worked in the same office as
his present counsel.

(34747 Tr., pA76, L.11 - pA78, L.9.)

This was a concrete

assertion of a potential conflict of interest in the form of divided loyalties - Mr. Skunkcap
asserted that his trial counsel was not diligently representing Mr. Skunkcap's interests
due to a hesitation to say or do anything that may be critical of his present counsel's coworker and boss. Accordingly, the State's assertion that Mr. Skunkcap did not allege a
conflict in 34747 is incorrect.
Similarly, both Mr. Skunkcap and his counsel in 38249 approached the district
court with concerns of a potential conflict in the form of a breakdown of the attorney
client relationship. In fact, counsel filed a motion to withdraw on the basis of a conflict of
interest. (38249 Tr., pp.26-27.) Although Mr. Skunkcap was not present at the hearing
on his counsel's motion, and therefore was not permitted to voice his objections at that
time, Mr. Skunkcap informed the district court that he believed a conflict with his trial
counsel existed at a subsequent hearing.

(38249 Tr., p.12, L5 - p.16, LA.) These

facts put the district court on notice that there was a potential conflict between
Mr. Skunkcap and his appointed counsel.
"Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259
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(Ct. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003)). The State does
not dispute that this inquiry did not occur in either 34747 or 38249.

Accordingly,

Mr. Skunkcap submits that he has demonstrated reversible error in the district court's
failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry as to his potential conflict with appointed counsel.

VI.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Skunkcap's Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence
In NO.38249 Because Mr. Skunkcap's Original Sentence For Felony Eluding A Police
Officer, With A Persistent Violator Sentencing Enhancement, Became Void Upon The
District Court Granting His Motion To Withdraw His Plea To This Enhancement And The
District Court Never Resentenced Mr. Skunkcap For The Underlying Offense
A.

Introduction
The State in this appeal has asserted that the district court "reinstated the original

eluding sentence," when the district court partly granted Mr. Skunkcap's motion alleging
an illegal sentence in 38249. However, a review of the record in this case, including the
district court's order on Mr. Skunkcap's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motion reveals this not to be the case.
Mr.

Skunkcap's withdrawal

of his

Because the district court, following

plea to the

persistent violator sentencing

enhancement, never resentenced Mr. Skunkcap for his underlying offense of felony
eluding an officer, a remand for resentencing is necessary in this case.

B.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Skunkcap's Motion Alleging An Illegal
Sentence In No.38249 Because Mr. Skunkcap's Original Sentence For Felony
Eluding A Police Officer, With A Persistent Violator Sentencing Enhancement,
Became Void Upon The District Court Granting His Motion To Withdraw His Plea
To This Enhancement And The District Court Never Resentenced Mr. Skunkcap
For The Underlying Offense
To the extent the State suggests that the district court in this case actually

entered - or re-entered - a sentence for Mr. Skunkcap's felony eluding conviction, the
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State's assertion is not supported by the record in this case. After Mr. Skunkcap was
permitted to withdraw his plea to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement
alleged by the State, and subsequent found to be a persistent violator following a jury
trial, the district court at sentencing failed to resentence Mr. Skunkcap for his underlying
conviction of felony eluding an officer in addition to the sentencing enhancement. 3
"The only legally cognizable sentence in a criminal case is the actual oral
pronouncement in the presence of the defendant." State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 254
(Ct. App. 2003).

At the re-sentencing hearing in this case, the district court did not

pronounce a new sentence for Mr. Skunkcap - and, in fact, stated that it had no
authority to do so. The court stated, "The five years Judge McDermott gave you for the
eluding charge, like I said, I can't do anything about that." (38249 Tr., p.314, Ls.2123.)

The fact that the district court was under the mistaken belief that it was not

required to re-sentence Mr. Skunkcap for the underlying felony eluding charge is further
borne out by the fact that his written judgment of conviction upon resentencing has no
provision whatsoever for his sentence for this offense. (38249 R., pp.114-116.) The
only sentence set forth at all was for the "crime" of persistent violator.

(38249

R., pp.114-116.)

Had the district court intended upon reinstating the prior sentence, as opposed to
erroneously being of the belief that it lacked the authority to resentence Mr. Skunkcap
for his felony eluding conviction, than the district court's language at the sentencing
hearing would have reflected the court's understanding that it had the power to address

3 In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Skunkcap erroneously references the underlying
conviction as one for grand theft in one portion of his argument. (Appellant's Brief,
p.57.) This should have listed as his conviction for felony eluding an officer.
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this sentence.

And, beyond this, the actual judgment of conviction entered by the

district court would have surely contained a provision wherein Mr. Skunkcap would
actually have received a sentence for his underlying offense. Neither is the case here.
Nor does the court's order on Mr. Skunkcap's motion alleging an illegal sentence
alter this fact. While the trial court stated it had the power to revisit Mr. Skunkcap's
original sentence, and whether to order that sentence consecutive or concurrent,
pursuant to its Rule 35 authority to grant leniency, the district court clearly was still of
the mind that the sentence imposed on Mr. Skunkcap for felony eluding an officer was
still extant and operative after he was allowed to withdraw his plea to the persistent
violator enhancement. This is apparent in the fact that the district court stated that, "the
sentences imposed by both Judge McDermott and this court were appropriate."
(R., p.135 (emphasis added).) In addition, the district court referenced the fact that it
had previously sentenced Mr. Skunkcap solely for "the enhancement charge of
Persistent Violator," with no mention of the court even imposing any sentence for his
underlying offense of felony eluding an officer. (R., p.134.) Had the district court been
aware that Judge McDermott's prior sentencing order was no longer operative upon
Mr. Skunkcap withdrawing his plea, the district court would not have referenced
Mr. Skunkcap's "sentences" issued by both judges and would further have noted that
Mr. Skunkcap's sentence for felony eluding had been re-imposed.
The district court ignored in its entirety Mr. Skunkcap's allegation of an illegal
sentence wherein he pointed out to the district court that the prior sentence was actually
void and re-sentencing on Mr. Skunkcap's underlying criminal offense was required,
not merely permitted. (R., pp.120-121.) In addition, even after reviewing the propriety
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of Mr. Skunkcap's sentence for felony eluding in light of the portion of Mr. Skunkcap's
Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, the district court still failed to enter any corrected
judgment of conviction that actually reflected a sentence for felony eluding. (R., pp.134135.) The district court's order on this motion states, in pertinent part, that, "the length
of the sentences on both the Eluding charge and the enhancement charge for being a
Persistent Violator will remain unchanged." (R., p.135 (emphasis added).) But, as has
been noted, Mr. Skunkcap had never actually been sentenced by the district court for
his eluding offense following the withdrawal of his plea. Accordingly, the district court's
recognition that it could reduce Mr. Skunkcap's sentence as part of a request for
leniency did not alter the fact that Mr. Skunkcap had never actually been sentenced for
his underlying offense.
However, the State does correctly note that the trial court, in ruling on
Mr. Skunkcap's Rule 35 motion, did recognize its authority to determine whether this
sentence would run consecutively or concurrently to his other sentence for grand theft.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.31-32.)

To the extent that Mr. Skunkcap had also asserted

error in the district court's failure to recognize its authority to determine whether his
sentence should run consecutively or concurrently, Mr. Skunkcap withdraws that portion
of his argument on appeal. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.59-60.)
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VII.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error,
In NO.34747 When The Prosecutor Intentionally Elicited Testimony From A Police
Officer Regarding Mr. Skunkcap's Exercise Of His Fifth Amendment Right To Remain
Silent
A.

Introduction
The State's sole argument on appeal regarding the repeated questions and

answers in 34747 regarding his invocation of his right to remain silent is that this error
was harmless.

Because of the volume of this testimony, the inadequacy of the trial

court's response to these improper questions, and the lack of overwhelming evidence of
Mr. Skunkcap's guilt at trial, he asserts that the State's claim is without merit.

B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental
Error, In NO.34747 When The Prosecutor Intentionally Elicited Testimony From A
Police Officer Regarding Mr. Skunkcap's Exercise Of His Fifth Amendment Right
To Remain Silent
The State has conceded on appeal that it was a constitutional error, plain on the

face of the record, for the State to repeatedly question Detective Nelson regarding
Mr. Skunkcap's invocation of his right to remain silent, as well as for the officer to
repeatedly reference his "attempts" at questioning Mr. Skunkcap in his testimony at trial.
The sole dispute on this issue for this Court's resolution is whether these multiple
instances of improper testimony were harmless. Mr. Skunkcap submits that they were
not.
From the outset, the State takes issue with Mr. Skunkcap's accounting of the
frequency with which the improper testimony was placed in front of the jury. The State
has characterized Mr. Skunkcap's argument as to the frequency with which the
constitutionally impermissible testimony was presented as "hyperbolic." (Respondent's
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Brief, p.30.)

Mr. Skunkcap respectfully asserts that, when both the prosecutor's

improper questions and Detective Nelson's improper responses are taken into individual
account, there has been no overstatement as to the degree to which the improper
testimony was injected into the trial proceedings. 4
By appellate counsel's count, the prosecutor in this case asked a total of eight
questions that either expressly called upon Detective Nelson to testify as to
Mr. Skunkcap's invocation of his right to remain silent, or otherwise incorporated
language about the officer "attempting" to interview Mr. Skunkcap within the State's
question. (34747 Tr., p.405, Ls.18-19, 21, 23-24; 406, Ls.11-13; p.407, Ls.6-7; p.408,
Ls.5-6, 9-10, 12-13.) For his part, the detective either directly testified to the fact that
Mr. Skunkcap invoked his right to remain silent when questioned by police, or
referenced "trying" or "attempting" to interview Mr. Skunkcap, in eight of his responses
to the State's examination on this issue. (34747 Tr., p.405, Ls.11-12, 20, 22; p.406,
Ls.6-10; p.407, Ls.17-19; p.408, Ls.7-8, 11, 14.) All of the statements and questions
that incorporated language referencing "attempts" at interviewing Mr. Skunkcap had the
same effect of commenting on his invocation of his right to remain silent as the
questions and responses that directly informed the jury of this fact. See Ellington, 151
Idaho at 59-61.
However, regardless of what arithmetic is used to measure the specific number
of offending statements and questions in this case, their volume is beyond dispute. The

Detective Nelson's statements are considered by this Court to the same degree as the
prosecutor's own questions because, "when an officer of the State gives any unsolicited
testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to the defendant, that testimony will be
imputed to the State for the purposes of determining prosecutorial misconduct."
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61.
4
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prosecutor in this case made it a continual theme in his questioning of Detective Nelson
to emphasize and re-emphasize the fact that Mr. Skunkcap was unwilling to answer
police questions, to no discernible end other than to infer Mr. Skunkcap's guilt.
In addition, the State argues to this Court that the trial court's instruction to the
jury that the court did not "want [the jury] to hold it against Mr. Skunkcap that he
wouldn't give a statement," was sufficient to cure these repeated errors.

(34747

Tr., pA09, Ls.6-10; Respondent's Brief, pp.30-31.) However, the State's argument in
this regard fails to address Mr. Skunkcap's argument as to why this admonishment was
inadequate.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.65-67.)

As has been previously noted, this

admonishment was deficient in two respects: first, the trial court improperly permitted
the State to persist in its improper line of questioning and the detective's improper
responses until a protracted chain of this testimony had been introduced; and second,
the district court's statement was legally inadequate, as the court merely expressed its
preference that the jury not consider this evidence rather than informing the jurors that
they must not do so. (Appellant's Brief, pp.65-67.)
Finally, Mr. Skunkcap asserts that his error was not harmless for the reasons
stated within his Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.64-65.)
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Skunkcap respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions of
felony eluding an officer, assault, and malicious injury to property in 34746; his
persistent violator sentencing enhancement in 38249, along with his sentence in 34746
and 38249; and his conviction of grand theft in 34747.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2012.

iSARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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